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In this paper, we argue that (bilateral) auctions of production quotas induced a rapid convergence in
dairy farm size within provinces in the early years of Canada’s supply management policy and that this
effect was stronger in provinces with a larger number of dairy farms. This contributed to the smallness
and homogeneity of Quebec dairy farms relative to dairy farms in Western Canada. In Quebec, most
dairy farms still rely on the tie-stall milking system, while dairy farms in Western provinces are
larger and use larger-scale, lower-cost technologies. Regulations on Quebec’s quota exchange have
slowed down the pace at which a farm can acquire production quota, exacerbating the effects of
input lumpiness, on dairy farm efficiency. Low trading on the production exchange severely constrains
production adjustments, making, scale, allocative, and technical inefficiencies more persistent and
investment in herd expansion unprofitable.
Dans cet article, nous avanc¸ons que les me´canismes permettant l’e´change de quotas de production ont
engendre´ une convergence dans la taille des troupeaux laitiers, surtout dans les provinces ou` le nombre
de fermes est e´leve´. Cela a contribue´ a` l’homoge´ne´ite´ et a` la petite taille des fermes laitie`res que´be´coises
par rapport a` celles dans l’Ouest canadien. Les fermes que´be´coises utilisent en majorite´ un syste`me
de traite de stabulation entrave´e alors que les fermes de l’Ouest canadien utilisent des technologies
qui entraıˆnent de plus bas couˆts mais aussi production a` plus grande e´chelle. La re´glementation du
me´canisme d’e´change de quotas de production a contribue´ aux difficulte´s des producteurs a` augmenter
leur quota de production et a` l’amplification des effets de non-divisibilite´ des intrants sur l’efficience
des fermes. Les faibles volumes e´change´s ont diminue´ la capacite´ des fermes a` ajuster leur production,
contribuant ainsi a` la persistance d’inefficiences technique, allocative et d’e´chelle et aux difficulte´s a`
abandonner la stabulation entrave´e.
INTRODUCTION
A supply management (SM) policy governs the Canadian dairy sector since the early
1970s. The policy revolves around a national production quota, based on costs of produc-
tion and estimated domestic demand, which is allocated to provincial marketing boards
responsible for the marketing of milk within provincial borders. By restricting supply,
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Canada’s SM dairy policy enables large transfers from consumers to dairy producers,
dairy product manufacturers, and other agents along the dairy supply chain. To gauge
how large the transfers to producers are, we can rely on the 2016 Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation single commodity transfers (SCTs) which measure the importance
of monetary transfers from consumers and taxpayers relative to gross farm receipts for a
specific commodity. For milk, Canada’s SCT is 44%, well above the SCTs of the United
States (13%) and the European Union (EU) (5%). In these countries, support is provided
by dairy programs funded by taxpayers. Canada’s support for its dairy industry also
stands out when compared to its support for other productions, like pig meat (1.6%),
Canola (2.7%), poultry (2.9%), and even eggs (33%).1 The maintenance of high domes-
tic prices requires a strict control of competing cheaper imports. This is accomplished
through restrictive tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) which impose a low tariff rate on a small
import quota while imports in excess of the quota are taxed at a high tariff rate. In fact, the
overquota tariff rates are prohibitively high and overquota imports cannot be profitable.2
Diafiltered milk, known as ultrafiltered milk in the United States, did not exist
when Canada drafted its import control list. Duty-free imports of diafiltered milk created
a breach in Canada’s strategy to prevent imports from reducing the demand for milk
on the part of cheese manufacturers. A second breach has just been created with the
implementation of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA). A gradual enlargement of cheese import quotas is being implemented.3 The
first breach was dealt with by introducing a new milk class (Class 7) in provincial milk
pricing grids to price out imported diafiltered milk.4 U.S. authorities are likely to file
a World Trade Organization (WTO) complaint about Class 7, but for the time being
Class 7 should contribute to growth in Canadian milk production. The government
response to the second breach is the recent announcement of two new programs, the
dairy farm investment program and the dairy processing investment fund. The former is
a cost-share program that will provide up to $250,000 per farm to support investments
in productivity enhancements. The implementation of an eventual North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 2.0 will most likely open another breach since Canada had
agreed to concessions of roughly 3% of its domestic markets for SM products in the failed
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
1 Source http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/producerandconsumersupportestimates
database.htm#country.
2 In the case of cheese imports, the import quota amounts to roughly 5% of the domestic consump-
tion. These within-quota imports are taxed at $0.04/kg (less than 1%), but any overquota imports
would be taxed at 245%. Imports of other dairy products, like ice cream and yogurt, are taxed in a
similar fashion.
3 The EU currently has two-thirds of the 205,000 tons/year import quota. Cheese imports will
increase to 36,500 tons/year by 2022.
4 Class 7 allow Canadian dairy manufacturers to purchase at low prices skim milk components
to manufacture dairy ingredients to displace imports of diafiltered milk. Canadian dairy farmers
receive roughly $40/hectoliter (hl) for milk going into milk 7, which is much lower than what they
get for milk going into Classes 1–5 according to the Canadian Dairy Information Center (2015).
Cheese manufacturers remain constrained by compositional standards that impose floors on the
quantity of fresh milk to be used in the production of cheese. See Felt et al (2012) for an economic
analysis of these standards.
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Productivity and costs vary tremendously in milk production. Mosheim and Lovell
(2009) provide evidence that average cost differences between dairy farms are not driven
by differences in technical or allocative efficiencies, but by economies of size, the average
cost curve beingL-shapedwithminimumefficiency scale being at herds of over 1,000 cows.
The USDA (2017) reports that the average cost of production for herds with over 1,000
cows is US$20.60/hundredweight (cwt) ($59/hl) as opposed to US$37.01/cwt ($105/hl)
for herds with 50–99 cows. The type of milking system used on a dairy farm is highly
correlated with herd size. The tie-stall milking system is particularly well-suited for herds
of less than 60 cows, while free stall and robotic systems are better suited for herds in
excess of 100 cows (Gosselin 2015).5 A glance at Table 1 provides an appreciation for
the productivity gap faced by Quebec and, to a lesser extent, Ontario dairy farms. Tie-
stall farms make up 89% and 68% of Quebec and Ontario dairy farms, while for British
Colombia andAlberta the proportions are 4% and 10%.Moving from onemilking system
to another is costly because it entails investing in building, machinery, equipment, cows,
and production quota.
A significant increase in the demand for butter and speciality and cheddar cheeses in
2016 has provided impetus to on-farm investment. The recent upturn in the demand for
dairy products induced emissions of additional production quota for all dairy farmers.
Since producers have incentive to equate herd size to barn capacity, some producers
had to decide between investing in new production capacity or to sell production quota.
One farm invested $2.2 million in milking robots and production quotas to increase
production from 100 kg/butterfat (bf)/day to 200 kg/bf/day.6 Province-wide, Quebec
dairy producers reportedly invested over $550 million in new buildings, machinery, and
equipment in 2016 (Le Producteur de Lait Que´be´cois 2017). This is a major turn of events
because in 2011, two Quebec dairy farmers who had made large investments to increase
their production capacity were facing bankruptcy because they did not own enough
production quotas to operate at a profitable scale. In the end, these farmers received,
exceptionally, a priority of purchase (La Terre de Chez Nous 2011). The announcement
of the dairy farm investment program has added to the investment momentum. It remains
to be seen whether the program will favor switching to more efficient milking systems or
expansions of tie-stall operations.
The small size of Quebec dairy farms makes them particularly vulnerable to greater
import penetration or a potential phasing out of the SM program. Without a structural
change in theQuebec dairy industry, the competitive position ofQuebec dairy farmers can
only erode over time, making the SM policy increasingly costly and difficult to modernize
or replace. In this paper, we shed light as to why Quebec dairy farms evolved the way they
did and why it is so difficult to get out of what could be construed as a technological trap.
We argue that SM and the tradability of production quotas have had a profound
impact on the evolution of dairy industry in Canada. The ability to exchange production
quotas has made farms more homogeneous as average cost differences arising from
5 The average herd in Quebec is slightly over 60 cows, while in the United States it is 183 cows.
There is also an animal welfare argument for switching away from the tie-stall system. Several
jurisdictions, like Norway, have banned the construction of new tie-stall dairy barns (Barkema et
al 2015).
6 See https://informeaffaires.com/2017/05/investissements-de-2-2-m-pour-amf-savard/.
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differences in scale tend to be arbitraged, especially in provinces with quota exchanges
involving many participants as in Quebec and Ontario. The resulting homogeneity in
farm size tends to reduce variations in the valuations of production quotas from one
dairy farmer to the next. In the context of double auctions,7 a large degree of similarity
in valuations implies a large degree of asymmetry in the number of buyers and sellers
and a small number of trades. Regulations affecting the trading of production quotas in
Quebec, such as a price ceiling, a purchase limit, and tying a farm’s production quota to
its location when the farm is sold, have made it more difficult for Quebec dairy farmers
to expand and switch to milking technologies best suited for much larger herds. We also
show that these regulations can induce periods during which farmers use too much of
some inputs given their levels of outputs, thus increasing technical inefficiency.
The inability to adjust variable inputs quickly, like cows and labor, and fixed inputs
like barn size can severely constrain the profitability of a dairy farmexpansion. InQuebec’s
supply managed dairy industry, the limited availability of production quotas has been a
severe hurdle to increases in production capacity and the adoption of more competitive
milking technologies. Some inputs are lumpy, in the sense that they are available in few
discrete quantities that may not match the farmer’s desired quantity.8 We show that
output adjustments are critical to maintain scale, allocative, and technical efficiencies.
Surprisingly, the interaction effect between regulations and input lumpiness is a source of
technical inefficiency that previous studies do not recognize. By themselves, regulations
restricting production adjustments affect only on a farm’s ability to operate at an efficient
scale that exhausts all economies of scale. A scale-inefficient farmer still has incentives to
adjust its input mix in relation to changes in inputs prices (allocative efficiency) and to get
the most from all of the inputs (technical efficiency). Similarly, by itself the lumpiness of
certain inputs (e.g., milking equipment, machinery, hired labor) should affect primarily
allocative and scale efficiencies, limiting a farmer’s ability to adjust its mix of inputs in
relation to changes in input prices and forcing output adjustments. However, we show that
the combination of restrictions on production adjustments and input lumpiness induces
a pattern of technical inefficiency characterized by a jump followed by a correcting phase.
Inefficiency scores from an input-distance function estimated using an unbalanced panel
of Quebec dairy farms support this hypothetical pattern. The decomposition of technical
inefficiency accounts not only for the policy effects, but also for the more traditional
sociodemographic variables and regional effects (Singbo and Larue 2016).
Our findings have important policy implications. First, SM policies have limited
the capacity of farms to expand, especially in the east, resulting in a significant east–
west differential in farm size. The implication is that adaptation to a more liberalized
7 A double auction is an auction mechanism through which sellers and buyers simultaneously
announce their respective asks and bids which are then used by an auctioneer to call a clearing
price. Buyers whose bid was weakly higher than the clearing price pay that price and sellers with
asks that were weakly lower than the clearing price get to sell their products at that price.
8 Input lumpiness is a common problem that is especially acute in the brewing business as the
popularity of cannedbeers is increasing.Canadianbrewers source their cans from twoU.S. suppliers,
CrownHoldings and Ball Corporation. Theminimumorder of aluminum cans is 149,376 (24 pallets
of 6,224 cans), a “tall order” for microbrewers. See http://plus.lapresse.ca/screens/96e03096-6703-
4c5c-84ec-21a8ce6b34bc%7C_0.html.
618 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
trading environment will be much more difficult on small eastern dairy farms than on
larger western dairy farms that operate at a more cost effective scale. Second, current
regulations limit the trade of quotas in Quebec and the ease with which output can
adjust. This magnifies the inefficiencies arising from input lumpiness, deters investments
in lower cost technologies requiring larger scale of production, and makes any transition
to a more liberal trading system all the more difficult. The takeaway is that it is imperative
to improve the SM policy and make Quebec’s dairy farms more competitive now, as we
begin implementing CETA and might be implementing new NAFTA provisions in the
near future. With more Quebec dairy farms operating at scales comparable to U.S. dairy
farms, a SM phase-out will become politically more feasible.
The first section discusses Canada’s SM policy and studies about the performance of
Canadian dairy farms. Scale inefficiency is the object of many studies, but none dwells on
the theoretical link between policy, regulations, and technical inefficiency and none look
for policy-induced inefficiencies when conducting empirical analyses. The second section
presents the econometric model while the third section presents our empirical results. The
last section dwells on the implications of the results for federal policy makers, provincial
regulators, and dairy farmers.
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN FARM SIZE
Table 1 shows substantial differences in average farm size for different milking systems.
Removing the highest and lowest entries, the range in average herd sizes for the tie-stall,
free stall, and roboticmilking systems are, respectively, 55–80, 109–187, and 98–168 heads.
The tie-stall system has been around for a long time and it is particularly well suited for
small herds. Larger dairy farms have abandoned the tie-stall system because it is too
labor intensive. An Iowa farm survey shows that investment in a low-cost milking parlor
typically entails a jump in herd size, from an average of 73 cows to an average of 112 cows,
to secure increases in labor productivity (Bentley et al 2012). Table 1 highlights substantial
differences across provinces about the relative popularity of each milking system. Almost
89% of Quebec’s dairy farms and 68% of Ontario’s dairy farms are tie-stall farms while
only 3.7%of farms use thismilking system inBritishColumbia. It is also clear fromTable 1
that Quebec and Ontario farms tend to be small relative to Western Canadian farms
regardless of the milking system. It is also apparent in Table 1 that growth in herd size
has been much slower in Quebec and Ontario.
Adoption of a new technology like a new milking system by a farm corresponds
to a move from one cost function to another, like average cost functions AC1 and AC2
in Figure 1. Recent technological advances have given rise to different types of milking
parlors suitable for different herd sizes.9 However, whenCanada’s SMpolicy was designed
in the 1960s, there were fewer technological choices and most farms were very small. Let
us assume that all farms were operating along the AC1 and MC1 cost curves in Figure 1.
9 The envelope of these cost curves is L-shaped according to Mosheim and Lovell (2009). Thus,
there is apparently a minimum efficient scale at a herd size between 1,000 and 2,000 heads. This
scale of operation is almost nonexistent in Canada implying that there are significant economies
for Canadian dairy farms to exploit. Fair Oaks farms in Indiana has a 30,000-cow herd and mega
dairy farms have been recently built in China in response to the Russian ban on dairy imports from
the EU.
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Figure 1. Technological jumps and farm homogeneity
The SM policy constrains production on individual farms, but it allows for the trading of
production quota units within provinces to allow farmers with higher marginal valuations
to buy from farmers with lower marginal valuations, hence favoring efficiency. Consider
a farmer who has A units of quota and a second farmer who has C units of quota,
where each quota unit is equivalent to the milk output of a single cow. These farmers
have incentives to trade. The farmers’ respective quota rents or valuations for a block of
B-A = C-B units are given by the area between the price and their marginal cost. In
Figure 1, the farmer with A units of quota has an incentive to increase production to B to
exploit economies of scale. The other farmer has an incentive to downsize to operate at a
more efficient scale at B. If allowed, the two farmers would trade and would end up with
the same herd size. An unregulated system where farmers are free to trade their quotas
favors efficiency. Elskamp and Hailu (2017) show empirically that policies capping quota
prices in the Ontario dairy industry slowed down quota transaction between inefficient
and efficient dairy farms.
Production quota transactions occur on provincial exchanges and some gather a very
large number of participants (1,000–2,000) while others are very small (sometimes fewer
than five participants). If scale effects have a strong incidence on costs of production, then
the tradability of production quotas under SM encouraged convergence in herd size in the
early years of the policy when the number of dairy farms in each province wasmuch larger
than what it is today. In the short run, under a single production technology, farmers’
valuations for production quota became similar as differences in quota valuations were
quickly arbitraged on efficient provincial exchanges months after month. In the longer
run, with the introduction of new production technologies, dairy farmers were willing
to make new investment to increase production and operate at a more efficient scale.
However, the homogeneity in valuations made provincial exchanges increasingly one-
sided as most farmers, wanting to expand, were short of quota. Moreover, the fixed
volume of quota attributed to each province and the slow expansion of the total meant
that small quantities of new quotas were introduced. The number of transactions was
small in the 1980s and early 1990s and the bulk of production quota put up for sale came
from retiring farmers. Lambert et al (1995) report that only 3–4% of Ontario and Quebec
provincial quota was traded in 1990. Lane and Brinkman (1988) reported that 80% of the
quota units put up for sale in Ontario were from retiring farmers.
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Entry was difficult even in the early years of the SMpolicy and this contributed to the
homogeneity of dairy farms and the rate of decline in the number of dairy farms. Romain
and Sumner (2001) pointed this out when comparing average herd sizes for Canada, the
United States, California, and Quebec. They noted that the average herd size in Canada
and in the United States was about the same in 1976, but that the average herd size in the
United States began to grow much faster than in Canada from the mid 1980s until 2000.
Interprovincial trade in production quota is generally banned and differences in average
herd size across provinces becamemore noticeable. Interprovincial quota trading between
Quebec and Ontario took place during a few months in 1997 and 1998, and it was put to
an end because large quantities of quota were leaving Ontario. At the time, the average
herd size in Ontario was 25% larger than that in Quebec. Schmitz (2008) observes that
this outcome was predicted by Lambert et al (1995) who estimated supply and demand
functions for production quota in Quebec and Ontario to make an inference about the
pattern of trade. Lambert et al (1995) show the importance of scale effects and returns
from nondairy production in explaining the valuations of production quota.
Quebec dairy farms were not always smaller. The average Quebec dairy farm was
larger than its counterpart in the rest of Canada in 1976 (29 cows vs. 24 cows). But, it has
since grown at a slower rate, reaching 46 cows by 2000 while the average herd in the rest of
Canada had 57 cows then (Romain and Sumner 2001).10 Domestic growth in production
was slow in all provinces, but less so inWestern Canada. Asymmetry in population growth
motivated the switch in the allocation ofMarket SharingQuota (MSQ) for industrial milk
in 2000 from the 90-10 rule, which granted 90% of a MSQ increase based on a province’s
historical MSQ share and 10% based on the province’s share of the Canadian population,
to the 10-90 rule.11 Milk production in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba
grew by more than twice the rate observed in Quebec and Ontario between 1996 and 2013
(16–19% vs. 7%). Thus, there was a relatively greater availability of production quota in
Western Canada than in Quebec and Ontario.
The gap in average size between provinces has widened considerably over time and
restriction on the trade of production quotas across provinces played a role. In provinces
where the number of dairy farms was large, like Quebec and Ontario, the homogeneity
in valuations made the price of quota more stable, but it also created a large difference
between the number of buyers and sellers. As a result, production quota put up for sale
by farmers exiting the industry was divided up among a large number of scale-inefficient
bidders with similar valuations, making production expansion a lengthy process. Fur-
thermore, various regulations have exacerbated the problem. In Quebec, the volume of
quota that a producer can buy is limited to no more than 10% of its quota endowment.12
10There were 122,914 dairy farms in Canada in 1970, compared to 14,660 in 2006 (Canadian
Dairy Information Center 2015) and this rate of decline is the same as that of the United States.
MacDonald et al (2007) report that there were 648,000 dairy farms in the United States in 1970
and that only 75,000 were left by 2006.
11The Domestic Dairy Product Innovation Program also helps provinces where new products are
developed to keep the increase in quota due to market development. For more details, see p. 2 of
http://www.dfns.ca/Vol12No9.pdf.
12See section VII, paragraph 30 of the Re`glement sur les quotas des producteurs de
lait(http://legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/fr/ShowDoc/cr/M-35.1,%20r.%20208).
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Figure 2. Prices (a) and volume traded (b) on Quebec’s production quota exchange
Thus, it is more difficult for small, scale-inefficient producers to acquire larger volumes of
quota. Starting in 2007, Quebec’s marketing board imposed a price ceiling and it has been
retaining a fraction of all quota units sold to constitute a reserve to help beginning farm-
ers. The volume of quota traded declined following the gradual decline in price ceiling to
its CAD$25,000/kg/day target as shown in Figure 2. The price ceiling censors high bids
and prevents the market from efficiently allocating quota units to farmers who could get
the highest returns from owning them. Production quotas in Quebec were sold at prices
in excess of CAD$30,000/kg/day in 2006 prior to the price ceiling era. In a recent paper,
Chernoff (2015) estimated that the price of quota in 2010 in Quebec would have been
CAD$32,000/kg without the price ceiling, which is indicative of severe rationing.13 A
13To put this $32,000/kg estimate of the real value of production quota in Quebec, it is useful to
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Figure 3. Number of buyers and sellers involved in production quota trades in Quebec
price ceiling is also in effect in other P5 provinces and its adverse welfare effect in Ontario
has been documented by Cairns and Meilke (2012).
The difference between the numbers of buyers and sellers in Quebec’s quota exchange
in Figure 3 shows how difficult it is for a Quebec dairy farm to acquire additional produc-
tion quota. There was already a tremendous difference in the number of buyers and sellers
before 2007 when Quebec’s marketing board introduced a price ceiling. Transactions on
the Quebec exchange can take place only if there is enough production quota offered for
each buyer willing to pay the transaction price (i.e., the ceiling price in the last five years)
to get a minimum of 0.1 kg/day (about 10% of a cow’s production). This condition was
not met one-third of the time in 2014 and this is why there were no sales recorded for four
months in 2014. During 2014, there was on average 260 kg/day distributed on any given
month to an average of 2,300 buyers. At an average quota purchase of 0.11 kg/day per
buyer, the addition of a single cow to a herd requires over eight monthly purchases. All
else equal, this implies that the transition of a tie-stall 55-cow farm to a free-stall 120-cow
farm would take almost 48 years. Fortunately, the demand for milk has increased in 2016
and this offsetting effect has allowed some farmers to embark on expansion projects.
compare it to unrestricted quota prices prevailing at the time. In BC, 2010 quota prices hovered
around $38,500/kg. Alberta prices varied between $34,000/kg and $38,000/kg while in Manitoba
and Saskatchwan quota prices varied between $27,000/kg and $33,000/kg and $23,000/kg to
$33,000/kg. The 2017 quota prices in BC fluctuate around $42,000/kg, while in NB there were
sales below the $24,000/kg ceiling.
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There has never been a price ceiling on western provincial quota exchanges and the
smaller number of dairy farms has made it possible for producers to buy large increments
of production quota. These markets can suffer from thinness and tend to exhibit greater
volatility in price and in the volume traded. For example, data from Saskmilk shows
that there were on average less than two buyers and just three sellers for each of the
monthly quota sales in Saskatchewan during dairy years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015.14
In comparison, Figure 3 shows that there are 20–50 sellers and between 1,000 and 2,500
buyers on any given month on the Quebec exchange between 2007 and 2015.15 Auctions
with a few participants are typically less efficient and some participants may be able to
influence the outcome of these auctions. Despite the potential for costly inefficiencies,
dairy quotas auctions in western provinces have allowed individual producers in Western
Canada to address scale inefficiencies by making it possible for individual buyers to buy
as much as 20 kg/bf/day in a single transaction.
INPUT LUMPS, TECHNOLOGICAL JUMPS, AND EFFICIENCY
Since their adoption,Canada’s SMprogramshave been criticized for imposing deadweight
losses and too large a burden on consumers, for being regressive, for segmenting the Cana-
dian market, and hence limiting the gains from interprovincial trade (e.g., Veeman 1982,
1988; Larue 1994; Cardwell et al 2013). Other critiques pointed out to differential effect
of trade liberalization under SM policies (Vercammen and Schmitz 1992; Alston and
Spriggs 1998; Larue et al 2007; Pouliot and Larue 2012). Some authors have argued that
SM programs are responsible for the use of compositional standards as trade barriers
(Felt et al 2012) and prevent the tapping of export opportunities (Carter and Stein-
bach 2013). The literature says little about how Canada’s SM dairy policy might affect
allocative and technical efficiencies. In fact, previous studies reporting about technical
efficiencies typically decompose technical efficiency in terms of demographic variables
and farm characteristics (e.g., Mbaga et al 2003; Singbo and Larue 2016), but some have
allowed for agglomeration externalities/knowledge spillovers (e.g., Tveras and Battese
2006; Hailu and Deaton 2016). The exception perhaps is Slade and Hailu (2016) who
compare allocative and technical efficiency between dairy farms in Ontario and New
York State.
The performance of Canada’s dairy farms under SM has been the object of many
studies over the years. SM entails scale inefficiency and Moschini (1988) was among the
first to document this. Even with a SM policy, farmers still have incentives to adjust their
inputs in response to variations in input prices and to try to get the most from their
inputs. These arguments suggest that Canadian dairy farmers should be allocatively and
technically efficient.
Lumps and Allocative and Scale Inefficiencies
Let us first consider the implications of lumpy inputs. Such inputs are not perfectly
divisible and are available in one or a few set sizes that makes it difficult to meet exact
14See http://www.saskmilk.ca/index.php/quota-production/quota-exchange.
15The number of sellers began to increase shortly before the announcement about the conclusion
of the TPP negotiations. The number of sellers has since come down.
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requirements (i.e., to match the marginal value of the input with its cost). Sumner (2014,
p. 157) cites farm machinery, including milking parlors, and managerial capital as being
lumpy, while other authors mention that land is a lumpy input (e.g., Reardon et al 1994).
In a tight labor market, a farmer may be forced to offer a minimum number of paid hours
per week, say 40, even though the expected demand is for 35 at given input and output
prices, to prevent his hired hand from taking a 40-hour/week job elsewhere. All else equal,
there would be “unused” labor available, but the farmer would most likely respond by
either substituting labor for another input or by increasing production to get a return on
the additional 5 hours/week of labor that he is paying for and not using. Likewise, for
capital, a dairy farmer with 20 cows could invest in a milking robot capable of milking 50
cows and end upwith underused capital. Lumps have important implications on efficiency
because they can be a source of economies of scale, as pointed out by Sumner (2014), and
they limit substitution possibilities between inputs. Some lumpy inputs can be used in
part or fully. For example, a dairy barn with 60 stalls may house from 0 to 60 cows. Other
lumpy inputs, like tractors, employ the same engine whether they are used for light work
or heavy work. Finally, some inputs that are usually not considered lumpy, like cows, are
lumpy when production quota is available in small increments of 0.1–0.3 kg/day on any
given month.
To better see how lumpiness relates to inefficiencies, consider a simple example with
two inputs, capital and labor combined through a Cobb–Douglas production function
given byY = K0.5L0.5. In a world where inputs are divisible, wherew is the wage rate and r
is the rental rate, the farm’s cost minimization problem yields Ke = Y
√
w/r , Le = Y
√
r/w
and a minimum cost function given by C(w, r,Y) = 2Y√rw. Allocative efficiency is
satisfied because the capital–labor ratio equals the relative price of labor, k ≡ Ke/Le =
w/r . The farm is also scale efficient given the constant return to scale from the Cobb–
Douglas production function.
Now consider the case with lumpy capital and divisible labor. Capital is only available
in increments of 100 units such that K¯ = 100, 200, . . . . For a quantity of capital K¯ ,
the problem of the farm is to minimize its labor cost for a given output Y¯. From solving
the cost minimization problem, we find a cost function CK (K¯,Y, w, r ) = r K¯ + wLK ,
where LK ≡ Y2K¯ . This cost function is weakly larger than the cost function when capital is
not lumpy because input quantities may not be consistent with allocative efficiency. For
input costs w = r = 1, a quantity of capital K¯ = 100 and output Y = 100, the cost of a
farm is CK (100, 100, 1, 1) = 200 and this is equal to the cost for the case where capital is
not lumpy, C(1, 1, 100) = 200. This is depicted by point a in Figure 4.
Now, let the wage w rise from 1 to 1.25 so that the relative price of capital decreases.
If capital is not lumpy, the optimal level of capital is 111.803 and the optimal level
of labor is 89.44 for the same level of production Y = 100. The cost of production is
C(1.25, 1, 100) = 223.6. With lumpy capital, producing 100 units of output can be done
with the original level of capital (i.e., K¯ = 100) at a cost CK (100, 100, 1.25, 1) = 225 or
with twice as much capital (but less labor) at a cost of CK (200, 100, 1.25, 1) = 262.5.
Keeping the input bundle the same is the cheaper option, but it still entails extra cost due
to allocative inefficiency.
Decreasing output and labor or increasing output, capital, and labor can restore
allocative efficiency. Recall that allocative efficiency requires that Ke/Le = w/r . From
that condition, for K¯ = 100 andw = 1.25, the optimal quantity of labor is Le = 80 which
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Figure 4. Input lumpiness and allocative efficiency
yields an output Ye = 89.44. Similarly, for K¯ = 200, we find that Le = 160 and Ye =
178.88. Given constant returns to scale, doubling inputs entails doubling output under
allocative efficiency. Sumner (2014) indicates that lumpy inputs can give rise to economies
of scale. As a result, output adjustments can improve scale efficiency. To illustrate, we can
compare the average cost of production for efficient levels of outputs (points a and c in
Figure 4) to the average cost of production when the output remains at Y = 100. Simple
computations show that C(1.25, 1,Ye)/Ye = 2.236 and CK (100, 100, 1.25, 1)/100 = 2.25.
Had the change in the wage been larger, the cost of lumpiness would have been larger
and the choice not to buy a second lump of capital less obvious. For example, when
the wage rate increases to 2, CK (100, 100, 2, 1)/100 = CK (200, 100, 2, 1)/100 = 3 and
C(2, 1,Ye)/Ye = 2.82 for Ye = 70.71, 141.42, . . . In this instance, restoring allocative and
scale efficiencies can be done by decreasing output to 70.71 (i.e., point d in Figure 4) or
by increasing output to 141.42 (i.e., point e in Figure 4) or by multiples of 70.71. Output
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is difficult to adjust under a SM policy, particularly in Quebec where unused quota in a
given month cannot be leased or sold as in Maritime Provinces. Because it is also more
difficult to make temporary output increases in a tie-stall barn than in a free-stall one, it
is harder for Quebec dairy farms to correct allocative and scale inefficiencies. This lack of
upward output flexibility explains why some Quebec dairy farmers have had difficulties
filling their quota in recent months in light of the increase in the demand for milk.
It is also important to note that the cost of lumpiness rises with the share of the
lumpy input in the cost function and with the size of the lumps. If capital was available
in lumps of 200 instead of 100, the average cost of production at initial input prices
w = r = 1 and output (100) would have been CK (200, 100, 1, 1)/100 = 2.5 as opposed to
CK (100, 100, 1, 1)/100 = 2 and the farm would like to double its production to restore
efficiency. As this example shows, the additional cost arising from input lumpiness can
be substantial when the lumps are large.
This last point has important implications for farms that are planning to transition
away from the tied-stall milking technology because this entails large investments and sub-
stantial output increases to achieve allocative and scale efficiencies. The next subsection
dwells on the incidence of technological jumps on a different type of inefficiency.
Jumps and Technical Inefficiency
Consider now two milking technologies, 0 and 1, which require capital investments K0
and K1. The choice of technology imposes an upper bound on the number of cows that
can be milked. Accordingly, a farm can produce with excess capacity or at full capacity
given its choice of barn and equipment.16 Besides capital, production requires cows and
labor. Cows and labor are partly substitutable, but substitution possibilities vanish as the
number of cows become too small and isoquants become flat at some levels of labor.
In Figure 5, input combinations along YK00 produce output level Y0 given investment K0
while input combinations alongYK10 produce the same level of output under the alternative
technology. Given the relative price of labor, a K0-farm with a production quota of Y0 is
best to produce at point a, does not employ the maximum number of cows allowed by its
capital investment, and hence has unused capital. A K1-farm with the same quota would
produce at point b and is not using its capital at capacity. The cow–labor ratio of the
K1-farm is given by the slope of the dotted line 0b while that of the K0-farm is given by
the slope of the dotted line 0a. Even though both types of farms faced the same relative
input price, they use inputs in different proportions. The K0-farm uses relatively more
labor than the K1-farm and at that level of output it has lower cost since it operates on
lower iso-cost line. In terms of technical efficiency, both farms are inefficient as they have
unused capital.
For an outputY0, technology 0 is a better choice than technology 1.However, because
the marginal rate of substitution is zero when the output is large enough for the constraint
on the number of cows to bind, adding labor does not increase the output. In Figure 5,
the isoquant YK01 is a straight line because adding labor does not add to production. The
cost to produce output Y1 is much lower for the K1-farm than for the K0-farm. While the
K0-farm is at capacity, the K1-farm could still add more cows to its production. AtY1, the
16The production functions can take the following form: Yi = min(gi (Ki ), fi (Li , cowsi )), i = 0, 1.
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Figure 5. Technological jump
K1-farm has a lower cost of production and is technically inefficient while the K0-farm is
technically efficient, but has a higher cost of production. To produce at full capacity, the
K1-farm must purchase more quota to increase output to Y
K1
2 .
In Quebec, the production quota that a farmer could expect to purchase on any
given month on the quota exchange dropped significantly, especially between 2009 and
2011, and the volume remained low until a fewmonths prior to the conclusion of the TPP
negotiations in late 2015 (see Figure 2).17 Farms that had wished to expand, by investing
into a new technology or by making capital investment under an old technology, in years
prior to 2009, experienced an instant reduction in the pace at which they could reduce
underutilized capital and technical inefficiency. The extended transition toward efficiency
jeopardized the financial feasibility of large expansion projects. Accordingly, one would
expect an increase in technical inefficiency as farmers that had began expansion projects
in previous years ended up operating at higher than planned levels of technical inefficiency
while farmers who had considered expanding revised or canceled their plan.
The small quantities of quota available on the Quebec exchange made the switch to a
lower-cost milking system an unprofitable proposition. As mentioned earlier, two Quebec
dairy farmers who had made large investments to increase their production capacity
were facing bankruptcy when they were given an exceptional priority of purchase on the
quota exchange (La Terre de Chez Nous 2011). Under these conditions, Quebec dairy
producers have had no incentive to switch away from the tie-stall milking system and begin
“catching up” with western Canadian andU.S. dairy producers. The difficulty in securing
17Trade agreements are known to have anticipated effects (e.g., Magee 2008). The surge in the
number of sellers prior to the end of the TPP negotiations is consistent with long-term profit
reductions arising from expected market access concessions. Naturally, this does not preclude other
factors from influencing selling decisions.
628 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
a large bloc of production quota constitutes a formidable hurdle that keeps Quebec dairy
producers technologically trapped.
Dynamic Efficiency
Our discussion so far focused on the concepts of allocative, scale, and technical efficiency
in a static setting as does most of the literature. Stefanou (2009) discusses production effi-
ciency in a dynamic setting, distinguishing short-run from long-run adjustment processes
and the implication for the definition of efficiency. As traditionally assumed in production
economics, capital and possibly other factors are fixed in the short run and cannot be
adjusted. As a result, only a subset of factors, like materials and production labor, can
be adjusted in the short run. Conversely, the long run is the time horizon over which all
production factors are variable. Even though a firm is constrained in its ability to adjust
in the short run, a firm plans its investment for the long run. Ultimately, the difference
between the short and the long runs boils to adjustment cost. The cost to adjust some
factors is prohibitive in the short run and this is why these factors are treated as fixed.
In a dynamic model, external or internal costs to the firm prevent adjustment to
the optimal quantity of capital in the short run. Adjustment cost prevents firms from
making their operation more efficient rapidly. The dynamic stochastic frontier model has
the advantage to provide information on the expected efficiency score that will prevail in
an industry in the long run as well as the firm-specific paths of adjustment (Emvalomatis
2012). If adjustment costs are external to a firm, then one cannot argue that a firm is
inefficient (Stefanou 2009) because the observed inefficiency is the firm’s optimal response
to a short-run cost. There is a growing literature on dynamic adjustments (e.g., Silva and
Stefanou 2003, 2007; Kapelko et al 2017), most predicated on the notion that some inputs
are fixed in the short run. In contrast, our argument focuses on the limited supply of
rights to produce, even though we acknowledge that there are constraints limiting the
adjustments of some inputs. The construction of a new barn or the expansion of an old
one takes time. In the dairy industry, hired labor scarcity is often alluded to rationalize
the acquisition of milking robots.
The dynamics about the drop in production quota availability are quite simple. Even
before themajor drop in the availability of production quota on the exchange, a farm could
not secure a large bloc of production quota all at once. Thus, a farm that was investing
in production capacity expecting to secure a bloc of say 48 kg over a year, through 12
successive purchases averaging 4 kg, would embark on a pattern of declining inefficiency.
Once the capital investment is in place, any slack from insufficient production quota
induces inefficiency would gradually fall as more production quota is acquired. If the
quantity that can be obtained each month on the quota exchange drops in response to a
regulatory change,18 this extends the production acquisition process and hence the period
over which there is inefficiency. Producers who had invested in capacity, but were short of
production quota, saw the profitability of their investment fall. Producers who expected
the drop to be short lived or an increase in trades in the near future had no reason to
abandon their expansion plans. The two aforementioned dairy producers who obtained
a purchase priority in 2011 were visibly in this category. However, as it became more
18A binding-price ceiling on quota prices increases the number of buyers, reduces the number of
sellers, the overall volume traded, and the volume expected by each successful buyer.
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evident that the price ceiling would not be increased nor removed, incentives to expend
vanished and farms that had already made capital investments kept on moving slowly
toward the production frontier. Thus, convergence in expectations about adjustment costs
should translate into a jump in inefficiency followed by a gradual decline. This is what
the stochastic frontier model in the next section will try to validate.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY
We now turn to the data to investigate the incidence of the drop in the availability of
production quota that followed the price ceiling regulation on the technical efficiency
of Quebec dairy farms. The data do not allow us to investigate allocative efficiency and
therefore our focus is on technical efficiency.
Method
We use a stochastic distance function approach as in Singbo and Larue (2016) to test
whether the theoretical pattern of technical inefficiency described above is supported by
data about dairy farms in Quebec. The hypothesis revolves around a jump in technical in-
efficiency when the price ceiling was adopted, followed by a smooth decrease in technical
inefficiency beginning when the volume of production quota traded dropped drastically.
We will observe the hypothesized jump in technical inefficiency if dairy farms operating
with underused capital were significantly constrained in increasing output to restore tech-
nical efficiency. The hypothesized downward trend subsequent to the jump in technical
inefficiency should be observed if farms that had been considering expansion projects put
them on hold once it became clear that there would be less production quota for sale.
Meanwhile, the farms who had expanded and were operating at an inefficient scale kept
purchasing small quantities of production quota and slowly became more efficient. A
rapid decline in the volume of production quota traded began in 2009, two years after the
price ceiling regulation, and our theoretical argument suggests that it is around this date
that it should be easiest to detect the peculiar pattern of technical inefficiency discussed
above.19
Stochastic frontier distance functions are particularly useful in the analysis of scale
and technical efficiency in the presence of multiple outputs and inputs (for details, see
Kumbhakar and Lovell 2003, p. 48; Morrison-Paul and Nehring 2005). Quebec dairy
farms produce milk, beef from culled cows, other livestock products, and crops using
several inputs, namely, cows, land, machinery, other capital, labor, and energy. Newman
and Matthews (2007) point out that an input-oriented distance function is a better in-
strument than an output-oriented one when outputs constraints on output adjustment
apply. This is clearly the case for outputs under the dairy SM policy. Kumbhakar et al
19It should also be pointed out that the MSQ, a proxy for national industrial milk demand, was
essentially stagnant between 2008 and 2010, which contrasts with the large increase in 2016. Because
the MSQ is allocated to provinces, large MSQ increases alleviates the output adjustments problems
of Quebec dairy producers. The allocation of milk to processing plants in Quebec is regulated
by the convention de mise en marche´ du lait which defers day-to-day management to the provincial
marketing board.As for the allocation ofmilk, fluidmilk for consumption has first priority followed
by milk used for yogurt and ice cream, cheese, and finally butter and powder. Because butter is less
perishable, it is used as a buffer to deal with unexpected fluctuations in supply and demand.
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(2008) use a stochastic input distance function to show that Norwegian dairy farmers
responded to policy-induced constraints on milk production by increasing meat pro-
duction. Slade and Hailu (2016) also use a stochastic input distance function. They
report that large dairy farms in Ontario are more technically efficient and cost effi-
cient than smaller ones. One of the advantages of distance functions is that estimation
does not require input prices. While we can analyze technical and scale efficiencies with a
stochastic distance function, we cannot analyze allocative efficiencywithout reliable input
prices.
The input distance DI (X,Y, t) identifies the smallest input vector X necessary to
produce output vector Y, defined according to the set of input vectors L(Y, t) capable
of producing the output vector at time t. It describes how much an input vector may
be proportionally contracted holding the output vector fixed. The multioutput input-
requirement function allowing for deviations from the frontier is as follows:
DI (X,Y, t) = max {ρ : ρ > 0, (X/ρ) ∈ L (Y, t)} (1)
where DI (X,Y, t) is a measure of the radial distance from (X,Y) to the production
function, ρ is a scalar, L(Y, t) is the set of input vectors, and X = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ RN+
which in year t can produce the output vector Y = (y1, . . . , yM) ∈ RM+ . We use a translog
function to approximate the input distance function because of its capacity to approximate
arbitrary technologies. We normalize inputs in the distance function using the land input
(x3). For farm i at time t, the technological frontier and stochastic components are related
as follows:
− ln (x3it) = α0 +
N∑
n =3
αn ln x∗nit +
1
2
N∑
n =3
N∑
k=3
αnk ln x∗nit ln x
∗
kit
+
M∑
m=1
βm ln ymit + 12
M∑
m=1
M∑
l=1
βml ln ymit ln ylit +
M∑
m=1
N∑
n =3
γmn ln ymit ln x∗nit
+
N∑
n =3
δtxn t ln x
∗
nit +
M∑
m=1
δtym t ln ymit + δtt + δttt2 + vit − uit (2)
where x∗nit = xnit/x3it∀ n, i, t, vit is a random statistical noise, and uit is a one-sided error
term representing a technical inefficiency measure with ln DIi (Xi ,Yi , t) = uit ≥ 0 where
DIi (Xi ,Yi , t) ≥ 1 is the value of the input distance function of the i th farm using input
vector Xi and producing output vector Yi in year t. It is important to recall the regularity
conditions associated with the input distance function are homogeneity of degree one in
input quantities (i.e., linear homogeneity inputs) and symmetry. Linear homogeneity in
inputs implies that the parameters in the above equation must be restricted such that:∑N
n=1 αn = 1;
∑N
k=1 αnk = 0;
∑N
n=1 γmn = 0; and
∑N
n=1 δtxn = 0. The symmetry property
is imposed by restricting αnk = αkn (n, k = 1, . . . , N) and βml = βlm (m, l = 1, . . . , M). In
the model specification, linear homogeneity is imposed by normalizing the input vector
by one of the inputs.
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The empirical specification in Equation (2) uses a two-part error term with the first
representing deviations from the frontier, uit, and a random error vit which is an indepen-
dently and identically distributed random variable, N(0, σ 2v ). The uit’s are assumed to be
independently and identically distributed according to a truncated normal distribution
N(μi , σ 2u ). Our hypothesis about the inefficiency term uit is that the decrease in production
quota availability induced a jump followed by a downward trend. Figure 2b illustrates the
evolution of the volume of quota traded and can help to pinpoint when the jump might
have occurred as well as some experiments. The year 2009 turned out to be a better choice
than 2007 or 2008 in terms of model fit. There was a large decrease in 2007, but this was
followed by a period without a definite trend. In contrast, the downward trend between
2009 and 2011 is very clear. We rely on a decomposition of the inefficiency component to
test whether the data support a nonmonotone technical inefficiency trend. The so-called
conditional mean model was developed in the context of panel data estimators and as
such, it can be applied to cross-section and panel data (Stata 2015, p. 795).20 To test for
the hypothesized inefficiency pattern, we begin by specifying the farm-specific inefficiency
μit term as:
μit = ψ0 + ψ1T+ψ2age+ ψ3off − farmwork+ ψ4south+ ψ5north+ ψ6D2009a
+ψ7T ∗ D2009a (3)
D2009a = 1 if year≥ 2009 and D2009a = 0 otherwise. The purpose of this variable is to
capture the jump in technical inefficiency due to the drop in the availability of production
quota. Our prior about the coefficient for this variable is that it should be positive. The
time trend T= 1, 2, . . . and its interaction with D2009a , allows for different trends around
the hypothesized jump.We expect a negative sign forψ7. For robustness, we also estimated
specifications with year-specific effects, D20xx = 1 if year= 20xx and D20xx = 0 otherwise,
without T, D2009a and T ∗ D2009a , to allow for multiple jumps and more flexible trend
patterns.
Age is a continuous variable. Older farmers could be less inefficient because of their
experience, but they might also be less likely to make long-term investments and be
proficient with new information technologies. We do not have a clear prior about how
age affects efficiency. Off-farm work is a binary variable that equals one when the farm
operator engages in off-farmwork and zero otherwise. Dairy farmers involved in off-farm
work have less time to devote to their dairy business and this should increase inefficiency.
On the other hand, their herd is on average smaller, they have less land, produce less
of other agricultural outputs, and they are less likely to embark on time-consuming
expansion projects. Accordingly, the incidence of off-farm work is a priori ambiguous.
Following Rasmussen (2010) andMosheim and Lovell (2009), we include regional binary
20The Battese and Coelli (1992) estimator is commonly used to analyze trends in technical inef-
ficiency in panel data. Because it allows only for linear trends, it cannot be used to test for the
pattern inferred from our theoretical analysis. The conditional mean model offers more flexibility,
at little cost for the estimation of farm-specific inefficiency scores because our panel is unbalanced
and there are (unfortunately) many gaps. Trade-offs are common in frontier estimation. Amsler et
al (2016, p. 286) ignore the panel structure of their data and use a Cobb–Douglas form to focus on
estimators correcting for input endogeneity.
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variables in the decomposition of the inefficiency component to capture regional effects.21
The central region is the default. Naturally, other variables were considered in searching
for an appropriate specification.
The endogeneity of some inputs in the estimation of production functions is po-
tentially problematic. The argument is that there are firm-specific productivity shocks
observed by managers or farmers (but unobserved by econometricians) that allow man-
agers or farmers to adjust some inputs and hence production. Treating all inputs as
exogenous introduces a bias in this context. Recent contributions by Amsler et al (2016)
and Latruffe et al (2017) show different ways of addressing the issue in the context of
stochastic production frontier estimation. The premise is that some inputs can be used
more intensively to boost output in response to a positive productivity shock. As for the
estimation of an input distance function, Tsionas et al (2015) argue that input ratios may
also be endogenous as firms or farms attempt to make adjustments to be allocatively
efficient in producing exogenous levels of outputs as per our theoretical discussion in
the previous section. The proposed correction requires input prices which are often not
available, as in our case, or unreliable. However, in a context of production with lumpy
inputs and difficulties in acquiring production quota, input ratios should be more rigid
in the face of input price variations and the endogeneity of input ratios should be a lesser
concern in our case.
Data
The data are similar to those in Singbo and Larue (2016). The data are a farm account
series from theGroupe Conseils Agricoles du Quebec, a management group in the province
of Quebec, and thus only members of this group are part of the sample. Management
advisers collected the data during farm visits. Thus, our sample is not random. The data
include operator characteristics, revenue and costs of production, marketing practices,
production technology, and management practices. We limit our data sample to dairy
farms whose dairy farm cash receipts was at least 70% of their farm’s total farm cash
receipts so that each farm primarily focuses on dairy production. The data for this study
cover the 2001–10 period with gaps in 2003 and 2004.
Entries and exists contributed to the unbalancedness of the data along with missing
data and the deletion of observations due to inconsistencies. After cleaning the data, 182
farms and 549 observations remained. Of those, 78% pertain to operations headed by a
man. Our panels have gaps because some farms had missing variables for one or more
years. For others, observations are available only before or after the hypothesized jump.
These make up 38% of all observations. Dairy production is concentrated in the southern
part along the St. Lawrence River which accounts for about 70% of the dairy farms in
Quebec.
The data consist of two outputs (milk and beef and other nondairy) and five inputs
(feedstuff, labor, land, machinery, and other capital). Cattle are an inevitable byproduct
of milk production and this is why it is lumped with it. Aggregation of outputs into the
21The interpretation of regional effects in the inefficiency term is that as a group, some farmers
might face constraints that limit their ability to get the most from their inputs (Rasmussen 2010).
Regional effects could potentially justify the estimation of different frontiers as in Mbaga et al
(2003), but this would reduce the sample size in the estimation.
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above-mentioned product categories is performed by dividing total revenue from all of
the outputs by the To¨rnqvist price index constructed from individual output prices. Other
output consists of crop production and includes maize and forages. As maize is the main
crop produced by dairy farms, we use maize price as price reference to derive implicit
quantity index.
Inputs are aggregated into five categories of aggregate inputs: feedstuff (X1), labor
(X2), land (X3), machinery (X4), and other capital (X5). Land is expressed in hectares of
land cultivated. Labor is the number of workers including the farmer, his family mem-
bers, and paid labor. The quantity of feedstuff is calculated by dividing the total cost of
feedstuff by its To¨rnqvist price index. Feedstuff (X1) includes purchases of concentrates
and roughage. Machinery includes the actual cost of machinery which refers to interest,
depreciation, maintenance, insurance, contractors, and fuel. Other capital includes in-
terest, depreciation, maintenance, and insurance on buildings, cost of insemination and
control, and energy. The output and input prices used are prices from yearly Agricultural
Price Statistics from various sources like La Financie`re Agricole du Que´bec and Le Centre
d’Expertise en Production Laitie`re Que´bec-Atlantique (VALACTA). Cost shares are de-
termined in a similar way as the revenue shares mentioned above. All input and output
variables are mean-corrected prior to estimation, so that the coefficients of the first-order
terms can be directly interpreted as distance elasticities evaluated at the geometric mean
of the data.
Input andoutput variableswere aggregated usingTo¨rnqvist indices. The dairy output
includes milk sales, sales of embryos, and sales of culled cows. The second output variable
aggregates crop sales and sales of other livestock. Labor includes family and hiredworkers.
We transformed the input and output variables prior to estimation. First, we applied logs,
then we normalized at their geometric mean and finally we divided it by the land input
to impose the linear homogeneity property of the input distance function.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about the inputs, outputs, and operator char-
acteristics. The mean, median, and standard deviation are reported to give some insights
about central tendencies, dispersion, and skewness. The average operator is 47 years old.
Off-farm revenues were reported for 16% of our observations and the average revenue
Table 2. Summary of selected variables (number of observations, N = 549)
Variable Units Mean P50 SD
Labor Full time equivalent 2.76 2.53 1.28
Feed $ 135,157 112,711 101,786
Machinery $ 299,589 241,365 236,385
Other capital $ 124,328 39,184 243,152
Dairy output $ 452,211 387,703 333,151
Other output $ 114,443 69,136 149,060
Land Ha 63.46 54.71 38.40
Age Years 47.46 47 10.69
North Binary 0.53 1 0.4995
South Binary 0.18 0 0.3833
Off-farm work Binary 0.16 0 0.3689
634 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
from dairy outputs slightly exceeds $452,000 per year, compared to $114,000 for other
outputs. The median revenues being smaller than the means suggest that the distributions
of revenues are skewed to the right as a few larger farms pull the means to the right.
Results
Our hypothesis is about a nonmonotone trend in technical inefficiency and one might
wonder whether the presence or absence of trend in the estimation of the frontier might
affect the estimated technical efficiency pattern. Models with linear and quadratic trends
failed to converge. We estimated a model as in Equations (2) and (3), but without linear
and quadratic time trends in the frontier and compared it to a model without any trend
effects/disembodied technological change in the frontier. The models being nested, we
implemented a parametric test, χ2(6) = 7.15, p-value of 0.30, which failed to flag a
significant difference between the fit of the twomodels.We concluded that trend-input and
trend-ouput interaction effects were not important. This restricted model is our model 1.
Then, we estimated a model with a linear time trend in the frontier/Equation (2), but
without a linear time trend in the inefficiency component/Equation (3) to see whether the
switching of the linear trend across equations would alter significantly the results. These
models are nonnested, but their log likelihood functions are very close (428 vs. 425) even
though the linear trend effect, which enters the frontier equation in one model and the
inefficiency equation in the other, is significant in both models.
The technical inefficiency parameters from two models are presented in Table 3.
These are the estimated parameters of Equation (3), jointly estimated with the frontier
parameters presented in the Appendix. The coefficients in Table 3 for models 1 and
2 are very similar which suggests that whether a linear time trend is in the frontier
equation or in the inefficiency decomposition equation does not matter. It has already
been ascertained that interactions between a time trend and inputs and outputs had little
effect on the decomposition of technical inefficiency. Thus, standard trend effects are not
very important in this case.
The coefficients for age are positive and statistically significant which means that
older farmers tend to be less efficient. To put the size of the coefficients in perspective,
a 20-year age differential increases technical inefficiency by 0.028 and the average level
of technical efficiency is 0.68. This level is lower than that the 0.87 reported in Singbo
and Larue (2016) and the 0.81 in Hailu and Deaton (2016) for Ontario farms. Off-farm
work has a small negative effect on technical inefficiency, which might appear surprising
considering that operators working outside the farm have less time to spend on running
their farm. However, in our sample, farmers engaging in off-farm work have fewer cows,
lower dairy revenue, and lower other revenue and hence have less to do on their farm.
Perhaps, off-farm income should be modeled as a third output in the distance function.
Location matters and farms located in northern regions of Quebec tend to be more
inefficient than otherwise similar farms located in central and southern regions. Mbaga
et al (2003) found similar results in presenting results for dairy farms located in areas
where corn cannot be profitably grown and in areas where corn production is profitable.
The coefficient on the time trend for model 1 in Table 3 confirms the existence of forces
reducing inefficiency over time, which means that less efficient farms are catching up
with the more efficient ones. There is a large jump in inefficiency in 2009 followed by a
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Table 3. Stochastic distance functions estimation—Technical inefficiency parameters
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0015***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Off-farm work −0.0317** −0.0317** −0.0282**
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0138)
North 0.0436*** 0.0436*** 0.0386***
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0127)
South 0.0239 0.0239 0.0245*
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0148)
Time −0.0053** n.a. n.a.
(0.0026)
D2005 n.a. n.a. −0.1127***
(0.0166)
D2006 n.a. n.a. −0.0719***
(0.0182)
D2007 n.a. n.a. −0.0489***
(0.0182)
D2008 n.a. n.a. 0.07230***
(0.0212)
D2009a 0.4898*** 0.4897*** n.a.
(0.1738) (0.1738)
Time*D2009a −0.0362** −0.0362** n.a.
(0.0183) (0.0183)
D2009 n.a. n.a. 0.1615***
(0.0198)
D2010 n.a. n.a. −0.0432**
(0.0173)
Constant 0.2790*** 0.2521*** 0.2733***
(0.0356) (0.0325) (0.0335)
Ave. eff. 2001–08 0.7136 0.7154 0.7250
[0.54–0.99] [0.54–0.99] [0.55–0.99]
Ave. eff. 2009 0.6203 0.6073 0.6254
[0.48–0.78] [0.47–0.76] [0.49–0.77]
Ave. eff. 2010 0.6447 0.6279 0.6511
[0.46–0.87] [0.45–0.85] [0.48–0.87]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Minimum and maximum efficiency scores in brackets.
downward trend as expected. The drop in the volume of production quota traded that
began in early 2009 had a huge effect on technical inefficiency.
To assess the robustness of our results, we estimated the models only on farms for
which we had data prior and after 2009, which reduced the sample size to 340. We also
estimated the models with dummy variables in the distance function and in the decom-
position of the inefficiency to account for farms that exited prior to 2009 and farms
that entered in 2009 or after. The purpose was to ascertain whether selection effects
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arising from entries and exits could be strong enough to impact on the evidence about a
nonmonotonic trend. The results were very close to the ones reported both qualitatively
and quantitatively. Since the objective was to validate that the rationing of production
quota has significant effects on efficiencies, we assumed that the biggest jump in technical
inefficiency would coincide with the year that showed the largest reduction in the volume
of trade on the Quebec quota exchange. We relaxed this assumption by estimating models
with an inefficiency decomposition specification allowing for a time trend and dummy
variables for specific years beginning in 2007, the beginning of the price ceiling era, all
the way to 2010, as well age, off-farm work, and regional variables. The coefficients on
the time trend, age, off-farm work, and the regional dummies are almost identical to the
ones reported in Table 3. The coefficients for 2007 and 2008 were positive and statisti-
cally significant, but less than half the size of the coefficient for 2009. The coefficient
for 2010 was not statistically significant, signaling a return to a lower level of technical
inefficiency. This pattern is also consistent with our theoretical hypothesis, except that it
suggests that technical inefficiency began to increase prior to 2009 while confirming that
the maximum level of technical inefficiency occurred in 2009. Finally, we introduced year
dummies for all years along with age, off-farm work, and regional dummies to validate
the assumption of a downward trend in technical inefficiency prior to 2007. It turned out
that there was absence of trend between 2002 and 2004, a negative trend between 2005
and 2007, a positive trend in 2008 and 2009, and a drop in 2010. We report the tech-
nical inefficiency decomposition coefficients of this model with the zero trend imposed
between 2002 and 2004 in the last column of Table 3. The average level of technical inef-
ficiency in this last model is 0.37, which is essentially the same as in the more constrained
models.
The bottom part of Table 3 reports average efficiency between 2001 and 2008, and
for 2009 and 2010. The numbers inside the brackets are the minimum and maximum
efficiency scores. The most flexible specification, model 3, which does not impose any
particular pattern of inefficiency, produces very similar results to models 1 and 2. This is
indeed reassuring, but the above results must be interpreted with caution in light of the
deficiencies of our data set, including the early end of our sample in 2010.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Canada’s SM policy governing its dairy sector has been operating for decades. It has
shielded the industry from major trade liberalization initiatives in the past, but the im-
plementation of CETA will bring TRQ enlargements and modifications to NAFTA may
bring further liberalization. Canada’s SM policy has provided Canadian dairy farmers
with high and stable returns, but it has adversely affected their ability to compete under
trade liberalization, especially in Quebec where the average herd size is particularly small
and where most farms rely on the tie-stall milking system. The obvious questions that
come to mind is why are Quebec dairy farms smaller and what is preventing them from
“catching up”? We show that Quebec dairy farms were more vulnerable to scale ineffi-
ciency than farms in Western provinces even before Quebec imposed a price ceiling on
its quota exchange. The price ceiling and other regulations exacerbated the asymmetry in
the number of buyers and sellers, reducing the probability of trade and the volume that
an individual buyer can expect to get.
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We develop a theoretical argument showing how input lumpiness and the small
quantities of production quota traded on theQuebec exchange impact on scale, allocative,
and technical efficiencies. Using data from Singbo and Larue (2016), we use a stochastic
input-oriented distance function to detect a dynamic pattern of technical inefficiency that
supports our theoretical hypothesis. The inability to make output adjustments means that
farms using lumpy inputsmust operatewith toomuch of some inputs for too long,making
investments in lower-cost, larger-scale technologies unprofitable.As a result, Quebec dairy
farmer are technologically trapped and cannot catch up with Western Canadian dairy
farms in terms of herd size. The 2016 boost in milk demand has temporarily alleviated
the problem and spurred interest in herd size expansion and, in a few cases, in the
adoption of new technologies in Quebec. However, concessions on market access, under
CETA and possibly under NAFTA, will make the residual demand faced by Quebec
dairy farms shrink, reduce the average price of milk for farmers, and exacerbate the
inefficiencies discussed above. Under the status quo, many small farms will continue
buying small increments of quota from farms exiting the industry and too few will
be able to make the technological switch to be competitive. The competitive disadvantage
of Quebec dairy farms has rationalized the long-held position to exclude the dairy sector
from market access concessions. There were simply “too many to fail.” This strategy
will no longer work because Canada has made market access concessions and more are
sure to follow. Production quota must be made available to individual farms wishing to
make technological and herd size adjustments to be competitive. This can be done by
first removing exchange regulations preventing rapid herd expansions such as the price
ceiling, the limit on the volume that a farmer can purchase on any given month, and
quota location ties in the purchase of a dairy farm. Then, P5 regional exchanges should
be merged to allow interprovincial quota trades and farmers should be able to lease
unused quota. The same could be done in Western Canada. Dairy farmers exiting would
be fairly compensated for their production quota by other dairy farmers taking steps to be
“in it for the long haul.” This would allow regional competitive advantage to dictate the
reallocation of production quota and make the industry more resilient to market access
concessions. If the politics are such that Canada’s dairy SM program is to remain in place
for years to come, then it is in the national interest to improve it. Making the Canadian
dairy sector more competitive through SM improvements would lower domestic costs,
bring about output increases, and domestic price reductions which in turn would translate
into reduced margins on imported dairy products. A more competitive Canadian dairy
market would be less appealing for foreign firms and less of a priority for foreign trade
negotiators.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers and the editors for insightful comments and
suggestions. Funding from FQRSC-e´quipe de recherche and from the Canada Research Chair
program is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
Alston, J. and J. Spriggs. 1998. Endogenous policy and supply management in a post-GATTworld.
Canadian Journal of Economics 31: 220–39.
638 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Amsler, C., A. Prokhorov and P. Schmidt. 2016. Endogeneity in stochastic frontier models. Journal
of Econometrics 190: 280–88.
Barkema, H. W., M. A. G. von Keyserlingk, J. P. Kastelic, T. J. M. Lam, C. Luby, J.-P. Roy, S. J.
Leblanc, G. P. Keefe and D. F. Kelton. 2015. Changes in the dairy industry affecting dairy cattle
health and welfare. Journal of Dairy Science 98: 7428–45.
Battese, G. E. and T. Coelli. 1992. Frontier production functions, technical efficiency and
panel data: With application to paddy farmers in India. Journal of Productivity Analysis 3:
153–69.
Bentley, J., K. Schulte, L. Timms and L. Tranel. 2012. Low Cost Parlor System-
Producer Survey. Iowa State University Extension and Outreach. http://www.extension.iastate.
edu/dairyteam/milking-systems (accessed on August 5, 2015).
Cairns, A. and K. Meilke. 2012. Price ceilings on milk production quota values: Future or folly?
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 60: 93–112.
Canadian Dairy Information Center. 2015. Canada’s dairy industry at a glance.
http://www.dairyinfo.gc.ca/index_e.php?s1=cdi-ilc&s2=aag-ail (accessed on August 5, 2015).
Cardwell, R., C. Lawley and D. Xiang. 2013. Milked and feathered: The regressive welfare effects of
Canada’s supply management regime. Canadian Public Policy 41: 2013–62.
Carter, C. A. and S. Steinbach. 2013. Emerging Markets, Agricultural Trade and Canada’s Relative
Performance. Paper presented at the Third Annual Canadian Agricultural Policy Conference,
Ottawa, January 23-25. http://www.ag-innovation.usask.ca/2013policyconference.html (accessed
October 12, 2017).
Chernoff, A. W. 2015. Between a cap and a higher price: Modeling the price of dairy quotas under
price ceiling legislation. Canadian Journal of Economics 48 (4): 1403–29.
Elskamp, R. and G. Hailu. 2017. The impact of market intervention on quota mobility: The case of
the Ontario dairy industry. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 65: 249–70.
Emvalomatis, G. 2012. Adjustment and unobserved heterogeneity in dynamic stochastic frontier
models. Journal of Productivity Analysis 37 (1): 7–16.
Felt,M.-H., B. Larue and J.-P. Gervais. 2012. Compositional standards, import permits and market
structure: The case of Canadian cheese imports. The World Economy 35: 1053–72.
Gosselin, E. 2015. Un Que´bec Entrave´ dans un Canada Libre. Le Coope´rateur 44 (4): 36.
http://www.lacoop.coop/cooperateur/articles/2012/02/p36.asp (accessed October 6, 2017).
Greene, W. H., 2008. The econometric approach to efficiency analysis. In The Measurement of
Productive Efficiency and Productivity Growth, edited by H. O. Fried, C. A. K. Lovell and S. S.
Schmidt, pp. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 92–250.
Hailu, G. and B. Deaton. 2016. Agglomeration effects in Ontario’s dairy farming. The American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 98: 1055–73.
Kapelko,M., A. O. Lansink and S. E. Stefanou. 2017. Input-specific dynamic productivity change:
Measurement and application to European dairy manufacturing firms. Journal of Agricultural
Economics 68: 579–99.
Kumbhakar, S. C., G. Lien, O. Flaten and R. Tveteras. 2008. Impacts of Norwegian milk quotas
on output growth: A modified distance function approach. Journal of Agricultural Economics 59:
350–69.
Kumbhakar, S. C. and C. A. K. Lovell. 2003. Stochastic Frontier Analysis, p. 333. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Lambert, R., R. Romain, B. Basillais and C. Roy. 1995. Analyse de la Libe´ralisation des E´changes
de Quotas entre le Que´bec et l’Ontario dans le Secteur Laitier. Revue Canadienne d’Agroe´conomie
43: 209–23.
Lane, S. and G. Brinkman. 1988. A Study ofMilk Quota Prices in Ontario. OntarioMilkMarketing
Board Report, Guelph.
PRODUCTION RIGIDITY, INPUT LUMPINESS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL HURDLE 639
Larue, B. 1994. The implications of GATT and NAFTA on the future of supply man-
agement programs in Canadian agriculture. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 42:
451–61.
Larue, B., J.-P. Gervais and S. Pouliot. 2007. Should TRQs be liberalized to look more like quotas?
Implications for trade liberalization under a supply-management policy. North American Journal
of Economics and Finance 18: 247–61.
La Terre de Chez Nous. 2011. Quotas Laitiers: Deux Fermes Obtiennent Une Priorite´.
http://www.laterre.ca/actualites/elevages/quota-laitier-deux-fermes-obtiennent-une-priorite-
dachat.php (accessed April 1, 2015).
Latruffe, L., B. E. Bravo-Ureta, A. Carpentier, Y. Desjeux and V. H. Moreira. 2017. Subsidies
and technical efficiency in agriculture: Evidence from European dairy farms. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 99: 783–99.
Le Producteur de Lait Que´be´cois. 2017. Croissance et Gestion de l’Offre au Menu. juin.
MacDonald, J., E. O’Donoghue, W. McBride, R. Nehring, C. Sandretto and R. Mosheim. 2007.
Profits, costs, and the changing structure of dairy farming. Economic Research Report no. ERR-
47. USDA, Washington, DC.
Magee, C. 2008. New measures of trade creation and trade diversion. Journal of International
Economics 75: 349–62.
Mbaga, M. D., R. Romain, B. Larue and L. Lebel. 2003. Assessing technical efficiency of Quebec
dairy farms. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 51: 121–37.
Morrison-Paul,C. and R. Nehring. 2005. Product diversification, production systems, and economic
performance in U.S. agricultural production. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86 (5):
1308–14.
Moschini, G. 1988. The cost structure of Ontario dairy farms: A microeconometric analysis. Cana-
dian Journal of Agricultural Economics 36(2): 187–206.
Mosheim, R. and K. C. A. Lovell. 2009. Scale economies and inefficiency of U.S. dairy farms.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91: 777–94.
Newman, C. and A. Matthews. 2007. Evaluating the productivity performance of agricultural en-
terprises in Ireland using a multiple output distance function approach. Journal of Agricultural
Economics 58: 128–51.
Pouliot,S. andB.Larue. 2012. Import sensitive products andperverse tariff-rate quota liberalization.
Canadian Journal of Economics 45: 903–24.
Rasmussen, S. 2010. Scale efficiency in Danish agriculture: An input distance-function approach.
European Review of Agricultural Economics 37: 335–67.
Reardon, T., E. Crawford and V. Kelly. 1994. Links between nonfarm income and farm investment
in African households: Adding the capital market perspective. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 76: 1172–76.
Romain, R. F. and D. A. Sumner. 2001. Dairy economic and policy issues between Canada and the
United States. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 49 (4): 479–92.
Schmitz, A. 2008. Canadian agricultural programs and policy in transition. Canadian Journal of
Agricultural Economics 56: 371–91.
Silva, E. and S. E. Stefanou. 2003. Nonparametric dynamic production analysis and the theory of
cost. Journal of Productivity Analysis 19: 5–32.
Silva, E. and S. E. Stefanou. 2007. Dynamic efficiency measurement: Theory and application.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89 (2): 398–419.
Singbo, A. and B. Larue. 2016. Scale economies, technical efficiency, and the sources of total factor
productivity growth of Quebec dairy farms. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 64 (2):
339–63.
Slade, P. and G. Hailu. 2016. Efficiency and regulation: A comparison of dairy farms in Ontario
and New York State. Journal of Productivity Analysis 45 (1): 103–15.
640 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Stata. 2015. Stata Base Reference Manual Release 14. College Station: StataPress.
Stefanou, S. E. 2009. A dynamic characterization of efficiency. Agricultural Economic Review 10:
18–33.
Sumner,D. 2014. American farms keep growing: Size, productivity and policy. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 28:147–66.
Tsionas, E., S. Kumbhakar and E. Malikov. 2015. Estimation of input distance functions: A system
approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 97: 1478–93.
Tveras, R. and G. E. Battese. 2006. Agglomeration externalities, productivity, and technical effi-
ciency. Journal of Regional Science 46: 605–25.
Veeman, M. 1982. Social costs of supply-restricting marketing boards. Canadian Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics 30: 21–36.
Veeman,M. 1988. Supply management systems : Impact on interprovincial trade.Canadian Journal
of Agricultural Economics 36 (4): 711–23.
Vercammen,J. andA.Schmitz. 1992. Supplymanagement and import concessions.Canadian Journal
of Economics 25: 957–71.
USDA. 2017. Milk cost of production estimates. http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/milk-
cost-of-production-estimates.aspx (accessed on August 21, 2017).
PRODUCTION RIGIDITY, INPUT LUMPINESS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL HURDLE 641
APPENDIX
Table A1. Stochastic input distance functions parameters
Var. Model 1 Model 2 Var. Model 1 Model 2
Y1 −0.7968*** −0.7967*** Y1x4 0.0232 0.0233
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0418) (0.0418)
Y2 −0.0481*** −0.0482*** Y1x5 0.0190** 0.0190**
(0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0090)
x1 0.6798
***
0.6799
*** Y2x1 −0.0032 −0.0031
(0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0301) (0.0301)
x2 0.2675
***
0.2674
*** Y2x2 0.0404 0.0404
(0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0273) (0.0273)
x4 0.0843
***
0.0843
*** Y2x4 −0.0416** −0.0416**
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0207) (0.0207)
x5 0.0036 0.0036 Y1x5 −0.0014 −0.0014
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Y21 −0.1443*** −0.1443*** x1x2 0.0588 0.0587
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0900) (0.0900)
Y22 −0.0053 −0.0052 x1x4 −0.0718 −0.0718
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0598) (0.0598)
x21 0.0440 0.0441 x1x5 −0.0129 −0.0129
(0.0590) (0.0590) (0.0140) (0.0140)
x22 −0.0976** −0.0976** x2x4 0.0240 0.0240
(0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0577) (0.0577)
x24 0.0404
* 0.0404* x2x5 0.0225* 0.0225*
(0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0129) (0.0129)
x25 −0.0016 −0.0016 x4x5 −0.0129 −0.0128
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0086) (0.0086)
Y1Y2 0.0543
***
0.0542
*** t n.a. 0.0053**
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0025)
Y1x1 0.1836
***
0.1835
***
_cons 0.3974
***
0.3707
***
(0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0178) (0.0195)
Y1x2 −0.2107*** −0.2106***
(0.0583) (0.0583)
N 549 549
ll 424.8498 424.8519
Sigma_u2 0.0124
***
0.0126
***
(0.0077) (0.0078)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
y1 = dairy outputs, y2 = other outputs, x1 = feed inputs, x2 = labor inputs, x4 = machinery inputs,
x5 = other capital inputs. t = time trend and _cons = constant term. All inputs and outputs have
been divided by the land input x3. Sigma_u2 is the variance of the inefficiency term.
